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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between countries' fiscal balances and current accounts with
an emphasis on the role of fiscal rules. The direct effect of fiscal policy on the current account via
aggregate (import) demand is potentially amplified by indirect effects, materializing through interest
rate effects and inter-generational transfers that reduce savings. On the other hand, the implied
positive relation between fiscal and external balances is potentially attenuated by offsetting changes
in savings through Ricardian equivalence considerations. We expect this attenuation effect to be
stronger in countries with more stringent fiscal rules and test this hypothesis using a panel of 73
countries over the period 1985-2012. As previous studies we find a positive effect of fiscal balances
on the current account, supporting the twin deficit hypothesis. However, the effect of fiscal balances
on the current account depends on the stringency of fiscal (budget balance or debt) rules in place;
it is reduced by one third on average and virtually eliminated for countries with the most stringent
fiscal rules.
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1 Introduction
There is a large number of studies investigating the twin deficit hypothesis on the link
between fiscal and external balances. Recently this topic has received additional attention,
given the need of many countries for adjustments of both the fiscal and external balance
in the wake of the financial an economic crisis. The standard rationale for the twin deficit
hypothesis is that a government's fiscal deficit occurs together with a current account
deficit through demand, interest rate and real exchange rate effects. Numerous empirical
studies on the determinants of the current account have confirmed the positive relation
between fiscal balances and current accounts.1
Most studies so far have assumed the relationship between fiscal and external balances
to be homogeneous across countries; to the best of our knowledge none of the previous
studies has considered the role of fiscal rules, which can affect both fiscal and external
balances and the relationship between them. The public finance literature (see, e.g.,
Poterba (1994), Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002), Canova and Pappa (2006) and Fabrozio
and Mody (2006)) shows that fiscal frameworks, characterized, e.g., by stringent budget
and efficient auditing processes, can help to reduce fiscal deficits. And as outlined in more
detail below, fiscal rules may have further effects on the current account operating through
channels other than the fiscal balance (such as interest rates and savings). Against this
background, fiscal rules may be an important variable to be considered in empirical studies
on the twin deficit hypothesis, or more generally, the relation between fiscal and external
balances.
The present study builds on standard empirical models on the determinants of the
current account (Lee et al. 2008, Prat et al. 2010, and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012) and
augments these models by considering the role of fiscal rules. Based on a theoretical dis-
cussion of the potential linkages between fiscal rules, fiscal balances, and current accounts,
we use a panel of 73 countries over the period 1985-2012 to test for both direct effects of
fiscal rules on the current account and also consider, whether more stringent fiscal rules
affect the relationship between the fiscal balance and the current account. Thereby, we
make use of a novel dataset on the stringency of fiscal rules developed in Badinger and
Reuter (2014).
There are three main results: i) Confirming the results of previous studies, we find a
positive relationship between the fiscal balance and the current account. ii) There is no
significant direct effect of fiscal rules on the current account. iii) The magnitude of the
effect of the fiscal balance on the current account is significantly reduced, when stringent
balanced budget or debt rules are in place.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical
background, Section 3 describes the corresponding empirical model. Section 4 provides
a description of the data and the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 5
summarizes the estimation results and Section 6 concludes.
1`Current account' and `external balance' are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
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2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Twin Deficits: The Link between Budget and External Balances
A standard textbook representation (e.g., Obstfeld et al. 1996) of the current account is
given by
CA = S − I + (T −G), (1)
where CA is the current account, S and I are private savings and investments, and (T−G)
the fiscal balance (savings) of the public sector (taxes minus government spending).
The literature often attributes changes in the current account to public sector (in)stability,
as private savings and investments are relatively stable in the medium run (see, e.g., Krug-
man 1979). The relationship between CA and (T−G) is usually assumed (and empirically
found) to be positive, which is discussed under the heading `twin deficits' of fiscal and
external balances. In addition to the `direct' effect implicit in Eq. (1) (higher public
expenditures lead to increased imports through higher demand), the literature presents
arguments for `indirect' effects of the fiscal balance on the current account.
The distinction between direct and indirect effects is somewhat imprecise, since 
strictly speaking  all effects of fiscal on external balances are indirect. In the present
context, we define indirect effects as those materializing through channels other than
income related changes in import demand.
The first of these indirect effects materializes through the interest rate channel; fiscal
balances and interest rates are usually (and especially for small economies) negatively
related. E.g., in case of a fiscal expansion, higher interest rates are triggered by an
increase in total demand and the financing of budget deficits by bonds issuance (Kumar
and Baldacci 2010), which induces capital inflows and leads to an appreciation of the
domestic currency and thus lower net exports.
Second, Obstfeld et al. (1996), using an overlapping generations model, show that fiscal
deficits lead to a redistribution of income from future to present generations, thereby
decreasing savings and thus negatively affecting the current account. This relationship is
stronger the more agents are liquidity constrained.2
Both channels are expected to amplify the direct effect of the fiscal balance on the
current account, increasing the magnitude of their (positive) relationship. There is one
potentially important channel counteracting the emergence of twin deficits by weakening
the effect of the fiscal balance on the current account. In models using the Ricardian
equivalence hypothesis (e.g., Barro 1989) an increase in budget deficits will be offset
by an increase in private savings because the private sector fully discounts future tax
liabilities associated with the fiscal deficit.3 If Ricardian equivalence is incomplete, the
effect of the fiscal balance on the current account will be reduced rather then eliminated.
2A survey of sixty empirical studies on these direct and indirect effects is provided by Gale and Orszag (2002).
3Ferretti and Razin (2000) and Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008) argue that the link between the deficits (current account
and public sector) may be weaker the higher the public debt is, due to the private sector displaying Ricardian features and
therefore internalizing the government budget constraint.
3
2.2 Fiscal Institutions and Twin Deficits
The stringency of fiscal frameworks is expected to influence the current account in several
ways: Obviously, fiscal rules may affect the current account through their effect on fiscal
balances. Several empirical studies suggest that stringent fiscal frameworks (in terms of
budget preparation, implementation, rules, transparency requirements) have a positive
effect on the fiscal balance (e.g., Von Hagen 1992, Bohn and Inman 1996, Alesina et al.
1999, Gleich 2003, Hallerberg 2003, Wagner 2003, Filc and Scartascini 2004, Debrun
et al. 2008, Nerlich and Reuter 2013). However, since fiscal balances are included as a key
explanatory variable in our empirical model on the determinants of the current account,
this channel is not subject of the present study.
In addition, fiscal rules may affect the current account through channels other than
the fiscal balance. i) Stricter fiscal frameworks may increase the trust of agents into fiscal
forecasts, medium-term budgetary plans and the sustainability of public finances. This
leads to lower uncertainty about future fiscal policy and decreases precautionary savings
of the agents.4
ii) Several studies have shown that stringent fiscal institutions lead to lower interest
rates on government bonds and thus lower interest rates in general (see Johnson and Kriz
2005, Hallerberg and Wolff 2008, and Iara and Wolff 2014). One the one hand, this reduces
foreign direct investment and capital flows; on the other hand, it boosts consumption and
investment and leads to a depreciation of the currency (see Baxter 1995 and Abbas et al.
2011). These (potentially offsetting) effects suggest a possible direct relationship between
fiscal rules and current accounts, though the relevance and direction of the net effect is
ambiguous and remains to be determined empirically.
iii) Finally, fiscal rules may affect the current account through Ricardian equivalence,
operating through the effect of fiscal deficits on private savings and thus the current
account as evident from Eq. (1). The stricter fiscal institutions are (or agents believe they
are), the stronger should be the reaction of private agents to changes in public finances.
E.g., with stricter fiscal rules, an increase in a government's expenditures is more likely
to be met by a decrease in expenditures or increases in taxes in the future, and private
agents will thus increase their savings in anticipation to future changes in fiscal policy.
These arguments regarding the effects of fiscal institutions on the current account
and the channels constituting the twin deficit theories warrant an inclusion of variables
measuring the stringency of fiscal rules in empirical models of the current account. The
aforementioned effects of fiscal rules on the current account materializing through channels
i) and ii) can be regarded as direct effects of fiscal rules, i.e., effects unrelated to the
twin deficit channels, materializing independently and also without a change in the fiscal
balance.
In contrast, channel iii), reflecting Ricardian equivalence considerations, is relevant
only if there is a change in the fiscal balance and may thus be termed as indirect effect of
fiscal rules on the current account.
4Empirical evidence on the role of uncertainty for saving and investment is surveyed by Carruth et al. (2000) and Carmignani
(2003).
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As with the effects of the fiscal balance on the current account, the distinction between
direct and indirect effects of fiscal rules is moot, since all effects of fiscal rules are indirect
in the sense that they operate through intermediate channels. Notwithstanding these
semantic subtleties, the discussion above has several testable implications that will be
taken up in the empirical analysis on the determinants of the current account. First, as it
is standard in the literature, we expect a positive effect of the fiscal balance on the current
account, which comprises both direct and indirect effects in the sense defined above.
Second, we will test for both direct effects of fiscal rules on the current account (chan-
nels i) and ii)), as well as whether fiscal rules have an indirect effect on the magnitude
of the relationship between the fiscal balance and the current account (channel iii)). The
latter effect reflects the hypothesis that stricter fiscal rules enhance Ricardian features
of an economy, thereby offsetting demand side effects of changes in the fiscal stance on
the external balance and hence attenuating the twin-deficit relation. In other words, the
more stringent fiscal rules are, the smaller the effect of the fiscal balance on the current
account.
3 Estimation Framework
Before investigating the effect of fiscal rules, we re-estimate specifications used in recent
empirical studies on the twin deficit (Lee et al. 2008, Prat et al. 2010, and Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2012) using a larger dataset with more cross-sectional observations (at least 73
countries, compared with 54 in Lee et al. 2008, 33 in Prat et al. 2010 and 65 in Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti 2012) and a more recent time period (1985-2012 compared with 1973-2004
in Lee et al. 2008, 1970-2008 in Prat et al. 2010 and 1969-2008 in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
2012). Equation (2) shows our baseline empirical model on the determinants of the current
account, which is in line with previous studies:
CAi,t = α + βBBi,t + x
′
i,tγ + ηi + εi,t, (2)
where CAi,t is the current account of country i in year t and BBi,t is the fiscal balance
(both variables expressed relative to GDP); ηi denotes country-specific fixed effects and
εi,t is the idiosyncratic error term. The vector xi,t includes a set of control variables, as
suggested by Lee et al. (2008), Prat et al. (2010) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012),
which can be grouped into two subsets: determinants of saving/investment and structural
control variables.
The set of determinants of saving and investment contains five variables: i) two age
dependency ratios (less than 25 and more than 65 years old), as suggested in Gudmundsson
and Zoega (2014), to control for different saving-patterns depending on the age structure
of a country's population; ii) the stock of net foreign assets (NFA), following Lee et al.
(2008), to control for whether a) a country is wealthy (high stock of NFA) and can afford
deficits and therefore a lower trade balance or b) a country receives high net foreign
income flows improving the current account; iii) population growth, measuring the extent
to which a country will a have young work force in the future, which is expected to
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have smaller savings; iv) GDP growth, as proxy for new income potentials and perhaps
reduced saving behaviour (worsening the current account) and v) income relative to the
US, as a proxy of a country's development stage (as already emphasized in Obstfeld et al.
(1996), large developed countries have a lower saving-investment balance than developing
countries, thus implying a negative effect on the current account).
The set of structural control variables contains: i) the ratio of foreign direct investment
(FDI) to output as suggested in Prat et al. (2010) (which should have a negative effect
on the current account since FDI allows a more sustainable financing of deficits); ii) the
ratio of net exports of oil to output (controlling for oil-exporter countries whose current
account balances strongly depend on oil prices); and iii) the terms of trade that helps to
account for world market prices (which are expected to have a positive effect).
Additionally, three dummy variables are included: i) a Eurozone crisis dummy, con-
trolling for the 2008-2011 financial crisis and the following disruption in access to capital
markets (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012, p.8; expected to have a positive effect on the
current account); ii) an Asian crisis dummy for the 1997-2000 Asian financial crisis (ex-
pected to be positively correlated with the current account due to the macroeconomic
contraction); and iii) a financial center dummy, accounting for countries being a major
actor in financial trade (expected to have a positive effect on the current account).
After re-estimating and comparing the baseline model replicating the specifications
in previous studies, we investigate the `direct' and `indirect' effects of fiscal rules on the
current account. In particular, Eq. (2) is augmented by adding measures of the stringency
of fiscal rules (FR) as explanatory variable and its interaction with the fiscal balance
(BBi,t × FRi,t):
CAi,t = α + βBBi,t + ρFRi,t + φBBi,t × FRi,t + xi,tγ + ηi + εi,t. (3)
The parameter ρ represents the direct effect of fiscal rules on the current account, which
is ambiguous from a theoretical perspective as outlined above. Since the effect of BB
on CA is given by β + φFR, the parameter φ reflects the indirect effect of fiscal rules
on the (relation between the fiscal balance and the) current account. Assuming the twin
deficit hypothesis holds (β > 0), the discussion above would suggest that the sign of φ
is negative, i.e., more stringent fiscal rules reduce the effect of the fiscal balance on the
current account.
Finally, since we do not expect all effects of the fiscal balance and fiscal rules to mate-
rialize contemporaneously, we also consider a dynamic version of Eq.(3), which includes
one lag of the dependent variable (CAi,t−1).
4 Data
Data on the countries' fiscal balances and current accounts are from the World Eco-
nomic Outlook database (IMF 2014), data source of the control variables is the World
Development Indicators Database (World Bank 2014). The appendix provides a detailed
description of the variables, the data sources, as well as summary statistics (Tables A1
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and A2).
As measures of the stringency of fiscal rules we use data from Badinger and Reuter
(2014) and Bachtrögler et al. (2014). They derive measures for the stringency of fiscal
rules, based on the IMF fiscal rules database, which covers national and supranational
numerical fiscal rules in 81 countries from 1985-2012. It provides information on the type
of fiscal rules as well as their characteristics, such as the legal basis, enforcement, coverage,
escape clauses, provisions for cyclical adjustments and supporting features like indepen-
dent monitoring bodies or fiscal responsibility laws. From a methodological perspective,
they use partially ordered set (POSET) theory, which provides an attractive approach to
rank objects based on ordinal properties without assigning subjective weights (as usually
done in a composite index approach).
In the present study, we will consider two alternative indices of the most common fiscal
rules: i) budget balance rules (FRBR) aiming at balancing the fiscal budget or keeping it
within certain boundaries, ii) debt rules (FRDR) aiming at stabilising or reducing public
debt.
Each fiscal rule index ranges from 0 and 1 and is increasing in stringency, broadly
defined in terms of their hierarchy of the legal basis, coverage, and transparency and
accountability. Summary statistics are given in Table A2 in the Appendix.5
5 Results
We split the discussion of our results into three parts. First, we compare the least squares
dummy variables (LSDV) estimates of the standard specification from previous studies
given by Eq. (2) with those obtained for our extended sample of 73 countries over the
period 1985-2012. Second, we turn to the LSDV estimates of the augmented model
including our our measures of fiscal rules as described in Eq. (3). Third, we estimate the
dynamic variant of Eq. (3) using a generalized methods of moments (GMM)approach and
provide several robustness checks.
5.1 Basic Model
We begin by re-estimating the empirical models used in previous studies (Lee et al. 2008,
Prat et al. 2010, and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012) to set the stage for adding further
variables and check if the results hold up for a larger sample of countries and the most
recent time period. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 1 show the coefficients as reported in the
respective studies. According to their results, a one percentage point of GDP increase
in the fiscal balance leads to a 0.19 (in Lee et al. 2008), 0.48 (in Prat et al. 2010) and
0.28 (in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012) percentage point of GDP increase in the current
account.
Columns (4) and (5) use the same set of variables but a larger cross-section of 160
countries and time periods 1985-2008 and 1985-2012 respectively. Overall, the results
5For a more detailed description of the variables and a comparison with composite indices, see Badinger and Reuter (2014)
and Bachtrögler et al. (2014).
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obtained in previous studies holds up for our dataset, particularly the parameter estimate
of the fiscal balance, which is of main interest in the present context. The coefficient
of BB is statistically significant and positive, confirming a positive association between
the fiscal balance and current account. In terms of magnitude, the coefficients amount
to 0.147 (column (4)) and 0.203 (column (5)), which is in the lower range of the effects
obtained in previous studies.
[Table 1 here]
5.2 Adding Fiscal Institutions
As a next step, we investigate whether the stringency of fiscal rules directly or indirectly
affects the current account through the channels discussed in Section 2. Table 2 reports
the LSDV estimates of the baseline model (Eq. (2)) and the extended model (Eq. (3))
including fiscal rules. First, we test for direct effects of fiscal balance and debt rules by
including the variables FRBR and FRDR respectively. Second, we also test for indirect
effects of both types of fiscal rules (on the effect of the fiscal balance on the current
account) by adding interaction terms between the fiscal balance and the respective fiscal
rule, i.e., BB × FRBR and BB × FRDR respectively.
This yields five models: a baseline model without fiscal rules (column (1)), two models
for budget balance rules (column (2a) and column (2b)) and two models for debt rules
(column (3a) and column (3b)), all of which are estimated for the same (unbalanced)
panel of 73 countries from 1985-2012, which is determined by availability of data on fiscal
rules.
The twin deficit hypothesis is once again confirmed by the positive and significant
coefficients of the fiscal balance, which range from 0.186 and 0.212. Due to the smaller
country sample (73 countries in Table 2 instead of 160 countries in Table 1), some changes
in the estimates of the control variables can be observed. Age dependency ratios, oil
balance and the dummy controlling for the Asia crisis have no statistically significant
impact on the current account anymore.6 Furthermore, the effect of net foreign assets
(NFA) is reversed and remains only moderately significant at the 10% level. Finally,
relative income becomes significant and shows the expected negative effect on the current
account (see Prat et al. 2010).
In the present context, the variables of main interest are the two fiscal rule indices
(FRBR, FRDR), representing their direct effect, and their interaction terms with the fiscal
balance (BB × FRBR, BB × FRDR), representing their indirect effects on the current
account. The direct effects of fiscal rules, when included alone turn out significant at
10 percent (FRBR, column (2a)) or insignificant (FRDR, column (3a)); when included
along with the interaction terms, both variables are rendered insignificant. This suggests
that fiscal rules themselves do not appear to be significantly associated with the current
account. In contrast, the indirect effects of fiscal rules (on the effect of the fiscal balance
6In this context it is worth noting that numerous Asian countries that suffered from the 1997-2000 crisis are not included
in the smaller sample of 73 countries.
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on the current account) show a significant negative effect; this holds for both budget
balance rules (column (2b)) and debt rules (column (3b)).
Evaluated at the sample mean of FRBR (FRDR), the coefficient linking the fiscal
balance to the current account is reduced from 0.212 to 0.159 (from 0.203 to 0.156);
for countries with the most stringent fiscal rules the effect is reduced to 0.010 (-0.105),
which is not significantly different from zero. This implies that the effect of the fiscal
balance on the current account is not homogeneous but differs across countries, and that
fiscal institutions turn out to be an important driver of the cross-country heterogeneity.
Stringent fiscal rules weaken the link between the fiscal balance and the current account,
for countries with the most stringent fiscal rules the effect of the fiscal balance is virtually
eliminated.
[Table 2 here]
5.3 Dynamic Specification and Robustness
Table 3 contains the estimation results of the dynamic version of the Eq. (3) for budget
balance and debt rules. All models are estimated by the two-step generalized method of
moments estimator in first-differences by Arellano and Bond (1991). For the purpose of
testing the robustness of the results, three specifications are considered for both budget
balance rules (columns (1a4a)) and debt rules (columns (1b4b)): First, we re-estimate
the specification in columns (1a1b), restricting the time period up to 2007, excluding
the financial and economic crisis (columns (2a2b)). We next exclude observations where
the current account exceeds the thresholds of -15% and 15% of GDP (columns (3a
3b)); finally, columns (4a4b) exclude outliers defined as observations with standardized
residuals larger than two.
As in the static models, the coefficient of the fiscal balance turns out positive and
significant; the estimated short-run effects range from 0.113 to 0.209, the long-run effects
implied by the dynamic specification from 0.229 to 0.363. The results from the LSDV
estimates in Table 2 regarding the direct and indirect effects of budget balance and debt
rules on the current account are overall confirmed by the seven GMM specifications.
Direct effects of fiscal rules on the current account (FBR and FDR) turn out statistically
insignificant once their indirect effect is accounted for.
And as with the LSDV estimates, indirect effects of fiscal rules are negative and sta-
tistically significant throughout. The estimates of the indirect effect range from -0.080
to -0.268 for budget balance rules and from -0.296 to -0.462 for debt rules. In terms
of magnitude, averaged over all specifications and evaluated at the sample mean of the
respective fiscal rule, budget balance (debt) rules reduce the estimated long-run effect of
the fiscal balance on the current account from 0.286 to 0.210 (0.265 to 0.169).
[Table 3 here]
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6 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the relationship between fiscal and external balances with an
emphasis on the role of fiscal rules. If Ricardian equivalence is incomplete, one would
expect fiscal deficits to translate partly into current account deficits through reduced
savings. The hypothesis considered in this paper is that credible fiscal rules may enforce
Ricardian features of economies, thereby reducing the effect of fiscal policy on the current
account.
Accordingly, we test for direct effects of fiscal rules on the current account as well as
for indirect effects of fiscal rules on the relationship between the fiscal balance and the
current account, using a panel of 73 countries over the period 1985-2012 and indices on
the stringency of budget balance and debt rules.
In line with previous studies, we confirm a positive association between the fiscal
balance and the current account, which is supportive of the twin deficit hypothesis. Re-
garding the role of fiscal rules, we find no robust evidence for a direct effect on the current
account. However, the interaction between fiscal rules and the fiscal balance turns out to
have a statistically and economically significant effect on the current account: Stringent
balanced budget and debt rules reduce the effect of the fiscal balance on the current ac-
count by roughly one third on average, for countries with the most stringent fiscal rules,
the effect of the fiscal balance on the current account is essentially eliminated.
As a consequence, effective and stringent fiscal rules, besides their direct effect on
the fiscal balance, can play a role as automatic stabilizers of the current account by
dampening a deterioration (improvement) of the current account during periods of fiscal
deficits (consolidations).
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Table 1: Results from Previous Studies and LSDV Estimates of Eq. (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BB 0.190??? 0.482??? 0.243??? 0.147??? 0.203???
(0.039) (0.060) (0.028) (0.025)
Young age dep. −0.055?? −0.010??? −0.054??
(0.022) (0.002) (0.025)
Old age dep. 0.140?? −0.040 −0.150? −0.136 −0.142
(0.107) (0.060) (0.199) (0.205)
NFA 0.020??? 0.063??? 0.049?? 0.091??? 0.045??
(0.007) (0.010) (0.026) (0.020)
Pop. growth −1.220??? −0.069 −0.740 0.169 0.184
(0.241) (0.470) (0.203) (0.208)
GDP growth −0.210??? −0.184??? −0.072 −0.016 −0.071??
(0.039) (0.090) (0.041) (0.033)
FDI −0.159 −0.236??? −0.248???
(0.101) (0.028) (0.025)
Oil balance 0.230??? 0.223??? 0.239??? 0.060??? 0.070???
(0.035) (0.060) (0.018) (0.016)
Terms of trade 0.010 0.051??? 0.036???
(0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
Relative income 0.020? −0.005 0.027? −0.033 −0.035
(0.003) (0.010) (0.129) (0.082)
Asia crisis 0.060??? 0.046??? 0.037??? 0.084?? 0.087??
(0.010) (0.010) (0.033) (0.036)
Eurozone crisis 0.010? 0.018?? −0.012 −0.064
(0.010) (0.010) (0.079)
Financial center 0.030??? 0.014 0.101??? 0.116???
(0.010) (0.032) (0.027)
R2 NA 0.37 0.45 0.76 0.73
First year 1973 1970 1969 1985 1985
Last year 2004 2008 2008 2008 2012
Countries 54 33 65 160 160
Observations NA 1,044 503 1,576 1,980
Notes: Dependent variable is current account relative to GDP (CA); country fixed effects are included in all speci-
fications; robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels: ??? 1%, ?? 5%, ? 10%. (1) Lee et al. (2008), no
standard errors are reported, (2) Prat et al. (2010), (3) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012), (4) results for period 1985-2008,
(5) results for period 1985-2012. BB: fiscal balance, NFA: net foreign assets, FDI: foreign direct investment.
Table 2: LSDV Estimates of Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) for Budget Balance and Debt Rules
(1) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Base- Model Model Model Model
line BR BR DR DR
BB 0.187??? 0.186??? 0.212??? 0.187??? 0.203???
(0.058) (0.058) (0.067) (0.058) (0.062)
Young age dep. 0.043 0.063? 0.065? 0.035 0.045
(0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
Old age dep. −1.513 −1.721 −1.869 −1.501 −1.716
(1.394) (1.416) (1.380) (1.415) (1.359)
NFA −0.312 −0.299 −0.310 −0.295 −0.318
(0.202) (0.202) (0.200) (0.202) (0.202)
Population growth 1.975 2.152 2.300 1.963 2.157
(1.423) (1.444) (1.408) (1.445) (1.387)
GDP growth −0.151?? −0.153?? −0.146?? −0.150?? −0.143??
(0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063)
FDI −0.165??? −0.166??? −0.161??? −0.165??? −0.164???
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.046)
Oil balance 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.0157 0.015
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Terms of trade 0.019?? 0.018?? 0.020?? 0.019?? 0.019??
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Relative income −0.411??? −0.412??? −0.422??? −0.416??? −0.419???
(0.115) (0.113) (0.111) (0.116) (0.115)
Asia crisis 0.061 0.138 0.142 0.044 0.069
(0.382) (0.389) (0.386) (0.382) (0.382)
Eurozone crisis −0.555 −0.519 −0.571 −0.587 −0.563
(0.493) (0.489) (0.486) (0.491) (0.491)
Financial center 0.208?? 0.206??? 0.209??? 0.206??? 0.209???
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
FBR 1.201? 0.747
(0.663) (0.734)
BB × FBR −0.202??
(0.103)
FDR −0.52 −1.074
(0.686) (0.769)
BB × FDR −0.308??
(0.152)
R2 0.755 0.756 0.757 0.755 0.756
Notes: Dependent variable is CA; unbalanced panels comprising 73 countries and 28 years (1985-2012), making a
total of 967 observations; country fixed effects are included in all specifications; robust standard errors in parentheses;
significance levels: ??? 1%, ?? 5%, ? 10%. Baseline: without fiscal rules, Model BR: budget balance rule, Model DR:
debt rule. FRBR: budget balance rule, FRDR: debt rule.
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Table A1: Description of Variables
Name Definition Source
CA Current account (ratio to GDP) WEO
BB Fiscal balance (ratio to GDP) WEO
Asia crisis Dummy crisis in Asia Prat et al. (2010)
Eurozone crisis Dummy crisis in Eurozone -
Financial centre Dummy for important Financial Centre Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2012)
Young age dep. Old age dependency ratio WDI
Old age dep. Young age dependency ratio WDI
NFA Net Foreign Assets (ratio to GDP) WDI
Pop. growth Population Growth WDI
GDP growth GDP Growth WDI
FDI Foreign direct investment WDI
Oil balance Oil balance (share of total trade) WDI
Terms of trade Terms of trade WDI
Relative income Relative income to the US (in % of GDP) WDI
Notes CA: current account, BB: fiscal balance, NFA: net foreign assets, FDI: Foreign direct investment, WEO World
Economic Outlook, WDI World Development Indicators.
Table A2: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CA −0.026 0.076 −0.331 0.253
BB −0.021 0.049 −0.305 0.403
Young age dep. 0.461 0.239 0.159 1.054
Old age dep. 0.146 0.078 0.048 0.375
NFA −0.002 0.014 −0.070 0.172
Pop. growth 0.146 0.078 0.048 0.375
GDP growth 0.021 0.037 −0.166 0.147
FDI 0.046 0.072 −0.551 0.747
Oil balance 0.112 0.189 0.000 0.997
Terms of trade 0.351 0.083 0.072 1.000
Relative income 0.039 0.118 0.000 1.000
Asia crisis 0.161 0.381 0.000 1.000
Eurozone crisis 0.075 0.263 0.000 1.000
Financial center 0.060 0.238 0.000 1.000
FBR 0.266 0.396 0.000 1.000
FDR 0.152 0.325 0.000 1.000
Notes: Statistics refer to baseline sample (73 countries, 1985-2012, 967 observations). CA: current account, BB: budget
balance, NFA: net foreign assets, FDI: foreign direct investment, FRBR: budget balance rule, FRDR: debt rule.
